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Abstract 
 
The International Olympic Committee Faced with Political 
Interference: Winning the Battle between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Republic of China, 1952-1979 
 
Yuxiang Hao, MSKin 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Thomas M Hunt 
 
This thesis studies the IOC’s role during the 28-year battle between the PRC and 
the ROC for the exclusive right to represent China. It is argued that the IOC upheld its non-
politicization principle, which suffered slight deviation, while showing certain flexibility. 
The flexibility refers to the willingness to make concession and professing politics. The 
IOC adhered to the principles through the years, but was more pragmatic on the Two 
Chinas Question and proactively played the game for desired outcome in the 1970s. It is 
the pragmatism that allowed the IOC to minimize external political infringement and 
maintain the inclusiveness of the Olympic Movement. Ironically, playing the political 
game turned out to be the key to end political interference. This thesis deems the Nagoya 
Resolution to be a hardly political solution, because it did not have substantial political 
influence or generate further political disputes. Therefore, compromise made by the 
Olympic Movement can be justified by the situation and the eventual result. 
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The Olympic Movement was the biggest winner among the three parties of the 
battle. The IOC and the Olympic Movement gained expansion and lost a smattering of 
integrity. Whether the loss matters is arguable, and in comparison, the PRC and the ROC 
suffered much more loss. The ROC’s Olympic Committee kept its membership but had to 
relinquish political sigils. Despite the reinstatement of its NOC and the ban on ROC’s 
political presence, the PRC had to accept the reality of dual recognition. What they lost or 
failed to achieve was exactly what they fought the politicized battle for. 
The IOC’s autonomy was ground on which the IOC eventually solved the Two 
Chinas Question with minimum political exploitation. The non-intergovernmental and 
apolitical decision-making mechanism helped the Olympic Movement stand firm and 
survive relentless exploitation of super powers and international conflicts. The Presidents’ 
tremendous influence was made evident by the different paths in the development of the 
Two China Question during two Presidents’ respective terms. They Executive Board, who 
discussed the matter deeply, balanced the IOC’s position when the Presidents went too far 
with their personal opinions. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 THE RESOLUTION, THE VOTE, AND THE ENTRY   
On October 25, 1979, the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) discussed the issue of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) seat in the Olympic 
Movement, the “Two Chinas Question,” during their meeting held at Nagoya, Japan. The 
New Zealander member, Lance Cross, was alleged to be the last person who was defending 
Taiwan’s sole seat on behalf of China in the Olympic Movement. His requests were 
dismissed by the Romanian member, Alexandru Siperco, with the support from the then 
President of the IOC, the Lord Killanin from Ireland, and his successor, Juan Antonio 
Samaranch from Spain. A resolution was reached unanimously at the end as follows, 
China question 
Resolution of the International Olympic Committee Executive Board adopted in 
Nagoya on 25th October 1979.  
The People’s Republic of China:  
Name: Chinese Olympic Committee. 
NOC’s anthem, flag and emblem: flag and anthem of the People’s Republic of 
China submitted to and approved by the Executive Board. 
Constitution: in order. 
Committee based in Taipei: 
Name: Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee. 
NOC’s anthem, flag and emblem: other than that used at present, to be approved by 
the IOC Executive Board. 
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Constitution: to be amended in conformity with the “Olympic Charter” by 1st 
January 1980. 
This resolution, sent to all members of the IOC, will be subject to a postal vote. 
Ballots are to be returned to Vidy by 25th November 1979, with counting to take 
place the following day. (IOC, 1979b) 
 The voting result was 62 in favor versus 17 against, with 1 abstention and 1 ballot 
discarded. The PRC, after 28 years’ struggle, have the Chinese Olympic Committee 
recognized by the IOC and “recovered its rightful seat” (Liang, 2007, p.184). Xinhua 
(“New China”) News Agency (1979), the official news agency of the PRC, commented in 
its report that the resolution “shows that the IOC recognizes the Chinese Olympic 
Committee as the sole representative of China and the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee 
only as a regional institution” and it “reflects the plain truth that there is but one China.” 
In Zhenliang He’s biography, his wife, Liang (2007, p. 184), considers the whole process 
a fight to “maintain China's legitimate rights in the world of international sport and uphold 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The reinstatement in the IOC has been 
considered by the Chinese government a victory, not only in terms of expanded 
involvement in the international sport field, but also in terms of defending sovereignty, 
which is a hardcore political issue—the Beijing regime not only succeeded in taking over 
the right to represent China in this field, but has also rhetorically subordinated Taipei’s 
NOC and NGBs from then on. 
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1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A quintessential case where sport mixes with politics, the Two Chinas Question is 
included in most studies on the Olympic Movement’s political history (Cha, 2009; Espy, 
1981; Hill, 1992; Kanin, 1981). Most of the studies did not go further than an articulatory 
presentation of history and a brief overall comment that “the IOC had made a political 
decision” (Espy, 1981, p.188). The Two Chinas Question is mostly examined in a larger 
picture, along with the mutual boycotts of the United Sates and the USSR and other cases, 
in order to explore the reasons why political interference has always been inevitably 
keeping the Olympic Movement’s company. However, the gap still exists between the 
reason and the outcome—how the decision came into being and was made a political one, 
and how the Olympic Movement dealt with political pressure. While external political 
interference could be easily confirmed, it was another question whether or not that the IOC 
did politics and, if so, whether or not it was justifiable. In addition, with idiosyncratic 
features and a unique path of development, the China-Taiwan problem, a spin-off of the 
Cold War, deserves more special attention.     
Nearly all of the existing handful of case studies in English-language literature on 
this subject mainly focus on the political significance for the PRC or the ROC. Scholars 
who view it from the perspective of China unanimously interpret the process with regard 
to “high politics” (Brownell, 2005; Chan,1985 & 2002; Xu, 2008; Yu, 2008). Yu (2008) 
considers national security and territorial integrity the prime goal of China’s foreign policy 
in sport, and the “Olympic Formula” allowed China to downgrade Taiwan regime to the 
local-level government and gradually erase the name of “the other China” from the 
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international community. Chan (1985) deems that the resolution satisfied all three parties—
China (the PRC), Taiwan (the ROC), and the IOC—arguing that by accepting the Nagoya 
resolution, China was able to both return to international community and to have legal 
evidence to interpret Taiwan as an integral part of China. He further points out that China’s 
compromise in 1975 from the standpoint that Taiwan must be expelled to its eventual 
acceptance of the resolution, which maintained Taiwan’s status in the IOC despite 
“symbolic differences”, implicates China’s long-term plan on the country’s unification 
(Chan, 2002). Susan Brownell (2005) views the process from a geopolitical standpoint, 
relates it to China’s struggle for diplomatic recognition and considers it grounded in the 
shifting global balance of power.  
It is similar when scholars study from the perspective of Taiwan, though the focus 
also covers issues such as national identity. Jacobs (1980) listed Taiwan’s setback in the 
IOC in a section on foreign relations, prior to foreign economic relations. Still using the 
name “Republic of China,” Bairner and Hwang (2010) point out that the adoption of the 
Nagoya Resolution by all parties signals the termination of this name in the field of 
international sport. Huang and Wang (2013) also argue that the Nagoya Resolution 
negatively affected Taiwan in the way that Taiwan must change the name, flag and anthem 
for continued participation in international sports. 
However, few studies give sufficient attention to the International Olympic 
Committee, most of which is articulatory description of the events in which the IOC was 
involved. As aforementioned, Chan (1985) argues that reaching the Nagoya resolution was 
a win-win situation for all three parties. Sympathizing with the PRC, Brownell (2005) 
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criticizes the IOC’s stance on the issue as well as its ideological and political affiliation 
with the Western countries. Huang and Wang (2013) partly attribute the different stages in 
the development of the China question to three IOC presidents,1 but no more discussion is 
made on the organization.  
1.3 THE NEGLECTED IOC-PERSPECTIVE 
In the state trial of Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc., New 
York State Supreme Court Judge Norman Harvey ruled that the IOC succumbed to the 
PRC’s political pressure and discriminated against the Taiwanese athletes, who swore 
allegiance to the flag of the Republic of China (Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980 
Olympic Games, Inc., 1980).2 It is the fact, if only considering the political impact of the 
resolution—the Nagoya resolution was undoubtedly a victory for the PRC. However, when 
revisited, a few facts from the 28-year process mark the impressive impregnability and 
prowess of the IOC, vis-à-vis with state sovereignty3 as a non-governmental international 
organization (NGO): 
                                                 
1 The three presidents include the two presidents whose roles are talked about in later chapters in this thesis, 
Avery Brundage and Lord Killanin, and Juan Antonio Samaranch, who was Lord Killanin’s successor and 
guaranteed Taiwan that the status of Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, despite the changes, would not be 
lowered.  
2 Although the result was reversed after two appeals, the reason for the final judgment was that “[s]ince the 
Department of State, acting on the President's behalf, elected to defer to the IOC in matters concerning 
national representation at the Olympics, the issue was a political question, and beyond the powers of the court 
to review.” 72 A.D.2d 439; 424 N.Y.S.2d 535; 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9699. Retrieved from 
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic 
3 Although Taiwan is not diplomatically recognized as a sovereign nation by most government in the world, 
it had been the sole representative of China in the United Nations until 1971, and has still been governed by 
an independent government and is de facto a sovereign nation.  
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 The PRC replaced the Nationalist regime based in Taiwan as the sole representative 
of China in the United Nations in 1971, eight years before IOC passed the Nagoya 
Resolution. 
 Avery Brundage, who was criticized for siding with the Western countries and 
isolating China from the international sport community, stepped off the position of 
IOC President in 1972, seven years before the Nagoya Resolution was reached. 
 The Games of New Emerging Forces, another international sport organization 
established by developing countries, sponsored by the PRC, and supported by the 
Soviet, didn’t survive more than five years. One of the reasons was the IOC’s 
containment.  
 Beijing China made a huge compromise and the Taiwanese athletes were retained 
in the Olympic Movement, which was rare and almost unprecedented, considering 
the PRC’s intransigence on the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
 Despite the severe relationship between the PRC and the IOC and the slow 
rapprochement, the PRC has been attaching extreme importance to the Olympic 
Games and relating Chinese athletes’ performance to national glory. 
The PRC’s victory was politically unconventional, if not discounted, because 
Beijing would have eradicated Taiwan’s opportunity of international exposure as much as 
possible. What’s more, reinstating the PRC’s Olympic Committee had been reasonable 
since the PRC replaced the ROC in 1971, but the IOC did not immediately honor the PRC’s 
request for certain reasons. The prolonged process and the discounted victory could be seen 
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as the consequence of the IOC’s intransigence and the West’s dominance of the world 
order, like Brownell does. However, it can also be argued from a different angle. The 
current literature lacks scholarly works that study the IOC’s role when solving the China 
question, peruse its organizational behavior and decision-making process, or examine how 
and to what extent the political batter between the PRC and the ROC, and even the IOC, 
infringed the Olympic Movement’s integrity.   
1.4 THESIS OVERVIEW 
Intended to fill the gap identified above, this thesis posits a revisionist interpretation 
of the twenty-eight years’ battle fought between the PRC and the ROC—with the IOC as 
the focus of this study, it is argued that the IOC was a proactive participant and ended up a 
winner in the battle between the PRC and the ROC. The battle took its tolls—the IOC had 
to sacrifice the integrity of the Olympic Movement by professing politics itself. But this 
concession can be justified by the fact that sport, by its nature, is subject to political 
interference and infringement, and the outcome that the Olympic Movement finally 
included the largest population group in this world without excluding another much smaller 
but indispensable one. Although the Nagoya Resolution was the product of a long-lasting 
political game, it might not have direct political impact in Cross-Strait relations or world 
order. It may also indicate that, by professing politics, the IOC avoided further involvement 
in the political dispute.     
In Chapter 2, this thesis briefly revisits the history of the battle between the PRC 
and the ROC for the right to exclusively represent China in the Olympic Movement. The 
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IOC’s role, organizational behavior and decision-making process is then perused in 
Chapter 3. This chapter also continues to examine the conflict between the non-
politicization ideal, which the IOC strived to uphold, and the political influence that it could 
not avoid. Chapter 4 studies the IOC’s wins and losses while solving the Two Chinas 
question. The IOC is considered more a winner than a victim of political infringement, 
thanks to its organizational behavior determined by organizational characteristics, as well 
as the changes in world politics. The thesis reaches the conclusion in Chapter 5, along with 
the significance of this study, and indications for further studies.    
1.5 RESEARCH RESOURCES AND METHOD 
Most Chinese and Taiwanese official records are not accessible to the public, but 
key information is available from biographies and autobiographies of important 
individuals, such as Zhenliang He and Lord Killanin. The researcher also studied 
interviews with the key figures as sources of facts. They help throw light on how the 
Chinese and Taiwanese authorities manipulated their respective representatives in the IOC 
and pursued their respective interests. 
In addition, since the press in the PRC is owned, operated, regulated, and censored 
by the propaganda departments of the CPC at difference levels, the available reports and 
documentaries represent the official rhetoric at least to some extent. This is especially true 
with Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), the Chinese government’s official newspaper, Xinhua 
(New China) News Agency, the CPC’s official news agency, and CCTV, which is the state 
television broadcaster and managed by a vice minister in the state council.  
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The IOC keeps better historical records of meetings, events, and communication 
between individuals. The Olympic Studies Centre of the IOC provided meeting minutes 
upon the researcher’s request.  
The major research method of this thesis is document analysis based on the 
resources aforementioned. The differences in the narratives also provide grounds for cross-
examination.  
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Chapter 2: The Twenty-Eight Years’ Battle  
After the Chinese Civil War, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded 
in mainland China by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in October, 1949. At the same 
time, the Nationalist Government was exiled to the island of Taiwan where it still claimed 
to be the sole legitimate government of the Republic of China (ROC). Neither recognized 
the legitimacy of the other.  
Both established their respective National Olympic Committees (NOCs), the All 
China Sports Federation (ACSF) for the PRC and the Chinese National Amateur Athletic 
Federation (CNAAF) for the ROC.4 Both claimed to be non-governmental organizations, 
but were de facto managed and operated by the governments. 5  Consequently, both 
committees claimed de jure jurisdiction over all amateur sport activities, including 
Olympic-related ones, despite the fact that neither was able to preside on the other’s 
territory. Although there was not clear prohibition of multiple NOCs for a country in the 
most recent version6 of the Olympic Charter, it was certainly indicated that a certain 
territory could be represented by only one NOC, and “territory” generally referred to a 
                                                 
4 The ACSF was founded in 1950, it served as the PRC’s Olympic Committee until it was replaced by the 
non-governmental Chinese Olympic Committee in 1979 (though the head of COC has been governmental 
officials). During that period, ACSF was annex to the State Sports Commission and was managed by 
governmental officials. The CNAAF was established in 1924 and recognized as China’s Olympic Committee 
until the end of the Civil War in 1949.   
5 Both governments controlled their respective NOCs by all means. The President of the ACSF was the 
Secretary General of Youth League (the Youth League is the Communist organization for youngsters and 
directed by the Communist Party). Taiwan was also a de facto authoritarian state before democratization in 
the 1980s, without strong governmental control over all civil organizations. In addition, the CNAAF followed 
the Nationalist government to Taiwan showed its allegiance.    
6 Revised in 1946. Retrieved from http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Olympic%20Charter/Olympic_C
harter_through_time/1946-Olympic_Charter.pdf  
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sovereign nation.7 The battle between the PRC and the ROC over the right to represent the 
“but one China” was doomed to take place.  
2.1 “FABRICATING TWO CHINAS” AND THE PRC’S WITHDRAWAL 
The struggle officially began with the invitation the IOC sent to the CNAAF to 
attend the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games. The Soviet Union encouraged both the IOC—
to invite the PRC—and the PRC—to participate in the Olympic Games. Consequently the 
ROC boycotted the Games. Thanks to Soviet Union’s instigation and Taiwan’s absence, 
The PRC team decided to attend and arrived five days before the closing ceremony, but 
finished the only task assigned to it—raising the national flag of the PRC at the Olympic 
Games.  
In 1954, the IOC recognized ACSF as China’s Olympic Committee. The CNAAF 
announced its withdrawal in protest but was kept in the list of recognized NOCs by 
President Avery Brundage, which the PRC considered deliberate fabrication of “two 
Chinas” in international sport federations with political intentions. In 1955, the only 
Olympic Committee member from the PRC, Shouyi Dong,8 attended the Paris Session of 
the IOC, condemned the IOC for creating “two Chinas” and attacked Brundage and the 
U.S. Government. In 1958, the PRC officially withdrew from all international sport 
                                                 
7 Not until 1960 did the IOC clearly expand the definition of “country” that to “a geographical area, district 
or territory within the limits of which an Olympic Committee recognized by the International Olympic 
Committee functions or operates”. 
8 Another way to spell Shouyi Dong’s name is Shou-yi Tung. They represent two different way to translate 
Chinese names, though the former gradually replaced the latter in mainland China. 
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organizations which acknowledged both the PRC and the ROC. Consequently, the ROC’s 
Olympic Committee remained in the Olympic Movement as the only NOC from China. 
That the ROC’s Olympic Committee stayed did not mean that it could represent the 
whole China, as it had proclaimed. The IOC passed a resolution in 1959, requesting the 
Olympic Committee from Taiwan to change its name in correspondence with the territory 
over which it actually had jurisdiction (IOC, 1959c). A few substitutes were submitted, but 
the IOC did not arrive at unanimity. The delegation sent by the ROC’s Olympic Committee 
to the Olympic Games was able to compete under the name Olympic Committee of 
Republic of China after some upheavals (IOC, 1959a, 1960a, 1960b & 1964; Lord Killanin, 
1983, p. 103).  
2.2 THE SHORT-LIVED GANEFO 
Beijing did not willingly sit out. Nor did it Communist regime stop intervening in 
international sport events with political proclamation. In 1962, Indonesia, the host of the 
Asian Games, was persuaded by the PRC and Arab nations to refuse the participation of 
the ROC and Israel, two members of the Asian Games Federation. As a result, Indonesia’s 
NOC was suspended by the IOC in 1963 for discrimination based on politics (IOC, 1963b). 
Still supported by the PRC, along with the Soviet Union, Indonesia established the Games 
of New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) to boycott the IOC and the Olympic Games. The 
PRC was the biggest sponsor and proponent of the GANEFO. The IOC illegalized the 
GANEFO immediately (IOC, 1963a). In consequence, despite the large number of the 
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countries participating, only Indonesia, North Korea, and the PRC sent athletes at the 
Olympic level (Connolly, 2012). 
The first GANEFO was held in Jakarta, Indonesia in 1963. The PRC was the 
biggest winner. Renmin Ribao (1963) argued in an editorial that the success of the 
GANEFO was a powerful weapon to counter the Olympic Movement manipulated by the 
imperialists. The first Asian GANEFO was held in Cambodia at the same time as the IOC-
sanctioned Bangkok Asian Games. Again, Renmin Ribao (1966) celebrated the Games and 
aimed harsh criticism against the “U.S. domination and manipulation over international 
sports.” However, Egypt, the host of the second GANEFO scheduled in 1967, could not 
host for financial reasons (Lutan & Fan, 2005). Meanwhile, the PRC was inundated by the 
disastrous Cultural Revolution, and retired itself from most international activities. The 
GANEFO did not make it to the fourth anniversary. The PRC-sponsored politicization of 
sport failed. 
2.3 RAPPROCHEMENT AND THE FINAL SOLUTION 
In 1971, the PRC replaced the ROC as the sole representative of China in the United 
Nations, which was considered a sign of the PRC’s comeback into the Olympic Movement. 
In 1972, Lord Killanin succeeded Avery Brundage and tried to ameliorate the IOC’s 
relationship with the PRC. Meanwhile, the PRC, though quite passive, began to reach out 
and make friends, especially with IOC members, in the international sport community. In 
1975, the PRC’s Olympic Committee reapplied for IOC recognition and requested that 
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Taiwan be expelled once it was admitted. It then became a problem for the IOC as to how 
the Taiwanese athletes could avoid being excluded from the international sport community.  
The PRC requested the Canadian government to by no means allow the ROC 
delegation to enter and compete in the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games. However, the 
Canadian government had, since the bidding, guaranteed the IOC that the Olympic Games 
would not be infringed by political issues. The confrontation between the IOC and the 
Canadian government generated a global outrage, whether against or in favor of Taiwan’s 
participation. Eventually the IOC made a concession and proposed that the Taiwan 
delegation compete under the name Taiwan instead of Republic of China. The ROC 
delegation withdrew in protest. 
In 1977, Lord Killanin visited Beijing. He formed a China commission to 
investigate the Two Chinas Question, and visited Taiwan in 1978. The three members of 
the China commission did not reach consensus. Whether to include both NOCs or to expel 
Taiwan’s Olympic Committee remained undecided among the IOC members. The ROC’s 
position changed as well—while the PRC insisted that only one Chinese Olympic 
Committee could be recognized by the IOC, the ROC side did not object to the ideal of 
dual recognition. At the Montevideo Session in 1979, the IOC passed a resolution again 
recognizing both—the PRC found it unacceptable but proposed that it didn’t oppose an 
interim Taiwanese team which did not use its current name, national anthem, or national 
flag (Espy, 1981, p.186). Then there was the scene at the beginning of this thesis—the 
Nagoya Resolution, the postal vote, and the Chinese Olympic Committee’s return to the 
Olympic Movement. 
 15 
The ROC refused to accept the conditions of change, filed three lawsuits but didn’t 
win, and boycotted two Olympic Games in protest. Then Juan Antonio Samaranch, the 
successor of Lord Killanin, guaranteed that the status of Taiwan’s Olympic Committee, 
despite the name change, would not change. In 1984, the ROC’s Olympic Committee 
changed its name to Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee and participated in the 1984 Los 
Angeles Olympic Games. 
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Chapter 3: An IOC-centered Analysis 
3.1 OVERVIEW: THE IOC AND THE TWO CHINAS QUESTION 
Brundage perfectly summarized the nature of the Two Chinas Question as follows, 
After the war the Chinese National Olympic Committee … moved to Taipei. In due 
time another Olympic Committee was organized in Pekin and … was recognized 
by the International Olympic Committee, … After its recognition this Pekin 
Olympic Committee made repeated demands for jurisdiction over sport in Taiwan. 
This was always firmly denied by the International Olympic Committee, because 
this Pekin Committee could not possibly exert any authority over sport in Taiwan 
at this time. (IOC, 1959a, p.63) 
The Two Chinas Question is undoubtedly a conundrum caused by political 
interference, which was unwelcomed at the IOC. The IOC in principle was politics-
unfriendly through all its history. 
The International Olympic Committee was founded in June 1894, two years after 
Pierre de Coubertin announced his plan to bring the Olympic Games, which had not been 
celebrated for fifteen centuries, back to the modern world. It is the “supreme authority of 
the Olympic Movement” (IOC, 2014b). The IOC’s affairs are decided by IOC members, 
who are individuals representing the Olympic Movement in their respective countries and 
sport federations. The National Olympic Committees (NOCs) all over the world send teams 
of their respective countries and regions to participate in the Olympic Games. The NOCs 
are non-governmental organizations.  
The Olympic Charter is the constitution of the Olympic Movement. It has been 
rephrased and updated over time, but it remains a fundamental principle of the Olympic 
Movement that no discrimination should be made based on politics. A resolution passed in 
 17 
1946 reaffirmed that the IOC was devoted to excluding any political and commercial 
interference (IOC, 1950). Accordingly, the NOCs are required to be independent and 
autonomous and avoid political, commercial and religious interference (IOC, 1950). These 
principles and regulations were the IOC’s guidelines when dealing with the Two Chinas 
Question. 
This chapter analyzes the IOC’s role and behavior when solving the Two Chinas 
Question. The IOC played a complex role during the process—it was the promoter of the 
Olympic Movement and the protector of the athletes but also an additional rival to both the 
PRC and the ROC. It was also a failed mediator. The decision-making mechanisms of the 
IOC influenced the path in which the IOC approached the problem. Also, to the IOC’s 
disappointment, “no politics” was not realistic—political influence always existed. 
It is important, though, to clarify “politics” before moving forward. In addition to 
the government-related activities and external pressures that the IOC faces, it is 
acknowledged that the IOC’s organizational characteristics result in organizational politics 
and power dynamics (Hill, 1992, pp.56-69). However, this thesis mainly studies politics in 
the narrower sense. Unless specified, “politics” in this thesis refers to unilateral actions and 
bilateral or multilateral interactions in which at least one party involved is a governmental 
organization or representative.  
3.2 THE IOC’S ROLE WHEN SOLVING THE TWO CHINAS QUESTION 
The IOC’s mission and role has been explicitly revealed in a total of 16 items in the 
Olympic Charter in force as of December, 2014 (IOC, 2014a). Its content has been updated 
and enriched over the years, but these items can be divided into six categories, (a) 
promoting good sport governance, (b) celebrating the Olympic Games, (c) anti-doping, (d) 
protecting sport and sport practitioners, (e) promoting sport for all and for the future, and 
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(f) promoting peace. Among them, (a) (d) can be applied to this case. Although in the long 
term, the resolution may help promote peace across the Taiwan Strait, the IOC did not 
alleviate the tension between the PRC and the ROC or prevent a war, so (f) does not count.  
Nonetheless, the written role and mission doesn't cover all the actual roles that the 
IOC played during the game for IOC recognition. On occasion, the IOC was the rival of 
both the PRC and the ROC. More importantly, it is undeniable that the IOC provided good 
offices between the two parties involved, though the attempts of mediation ended up a 
failure. Therefore, the four major roles that the IOC played through the twenty-eight-year 
process were: (1) the authority and promoter of the Olympic Movement, (2) a rival of both 
the PRC and the ROC, (3) mediator, and (4) the protector of athletes.   
3.2.1 The Authority and Promoter of the Olympic Movement and Protector of 
Athletes 
To promote the Olympic Movement is one of the IOC’s primary missions in all 
kinds of international activities, sport-related or not. The high reputation and popularity of 
the Olympic Movement gave the IOC global influence. A seat on the IOC, the supreme 
authority of the Olympic Movement, would not only guarantee the right to participate and 
the potential to host the Olympic Games, but also was perceived by both the PRC and the 
ROC as sound proof of their respective regimes’ status as the sole legitimate government 
of China. However, the IOC’s focus was disparate from those of the PRC and the ROC—
the IOC prioritized the mission to involve more people in sports and strived to make efforts 
to protect the rights of the youth in both the PRC and the ROC to participate in the Olympic 
Games.   
The IOC was indeed the authority of the Olympic Movement and arguably of the 
international sport community, too. It can be proved by the sheer fact that the IOC, which 
comprised around one hundred members on behalf of the Olympic Movement rather than 
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of themselves or their countries,9 could decide whether a huge nation with a population of 
six hundred million10 was qualified to have a seat so that its delegation could participate 
in the Olympic Games. It faced challenges but successfully sabotaged the initiative of many 
developing countries in the 1960s to establish the Games of New Emerging Forces. After 
over a century, it remains one of the most influential and powerful international sport 
organizations. International sport governing bodies, such as FIFA and the IAAF,11 must 
follow IOC regulations so that they can stay in the Olympic Games to promote their 
respective sports. Likewise, national sport governing bodies (NGBs) must follow IOC 
regulations so that they can guarantee that their respective athletes can qualify for the 
Olympic Games. For countries where the government organizes and closely monitors 
almost all sport activities and greatly value athletic performance in the Olympic Games, 
such as the PRC and the DPRK, it means that the government must operate them as 
regulated by the IOC and recognize the cause of the IOC.     
Promoting the Olympic Movement was definitely one of the major concerns of the 
IOC, if not the only one, during the two Chinas’ battle for exclusive recognition. The IOC 
claimed to be “only concerned with putting its house in order independently of all political 
consideration” so that it could pursue its “main purpose … to guide and serve Olympic 
sport in order to foster among the youth of the world the physical effort and the moral 
values which constitute the basis of amateur sport” (IOC, 1959b, p. 32). The quotation is 
excerpted from the reply titled The Chinese Problem from the IOC to American official 
and public reaction towards IOC’s request that “the Olympic Committee of Nationalist 
                                                 
9 Theoretically. It is of course unlikely that the IOC members are capable of making decisions completely 
uninfluenced by their native countries (say, the culture in which they were brought up in). 
10 The population of China was six hundred million in the 1950s, and by the time the Chinese Olympic 
Committee was reinstated in the IOC, it had increase to a billion. 
11 FIFA, Fédération Internationale de Football Association, is the international governing body of football. 
IAAF, International Association of Athletics Federations, is the international governing body of track and 
field athletics.  
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China” (the NOC of the ROC) change its name in 1959. It is worth notice that the PRC 
withdrew from IOC-directed international sport activities one year earlier. Thus the 
requested name change left the IOC without even a nominal NOC for mainland China.12 
The IOC’s resolution in 1959 came into being not only based on the fact that the ROC 
government has lost governance over mainland China, but also because that the IOC 
intended to make room for a real NOC that could represent the grand territory over which 
Taiwan’s Olympic Committee did not have jurisdiction.  
The IOC indeed wanted to promote the Olympic Movement to the entire territory 
of the world’s most populated and third largest country. As early as 1952, the IOC made 
an exception to invite the ACSF to attend the Helsinki Olympic Games when it wasn’t even 
a recognized NOC.13 The IOC went on to recognize both the ACSF and the CNAAF in the 
Mexico City Session in 1954 so that both parties could legitimately send athletes to 
participate in the Olympic Games. However, the issue had tremendous political 
significance for both the PRC and the ROC and it couldn’t be solved by the IOC’s goodwill 
only.  
After the GANEFO, which was co-led by China and other developing countries, 
eventually collapsed, and the PRC’s involvement in Asian sport community greatly 
expanded, China again sought to solve the problem of the Two Chinas Question in the IOC. 
The IOC was more proactive than it used to be, too. Lord Killanin (1973), in his closing 
speech given at the 1973 Olympic Congress, clearly articulated that “we want China”, but 
“If there are problems we will face them round a table and not by pressure.” How athletes 
from Taiwan, over whom the PRC’s Olympic Committee did not have effective control, 
could participate in the Olympic Games after the PRC’s Olympic Committee was 
                                                 
12 As long as the National Olympic Committee of ROC remained in the IOC, PRC’s NOC would not reenter 
despite the proposed name change at that time. 
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recognized was a question that the IOC was determined to solve. When the Chinese 
Olympic Committee was finally voted to have a seat in the IOC with the problem of the 
status of the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee properly solved, Mohamed Mzali, the 
then vice president of the IOC, when interviewed by Xinhua News Agency (1979), 
commented that “the Nagoya Resolution made China return to the Olympic Movement so 
that representatives of 1 billion Chinese people would be able to participate in the Olympic 
Games. Then, the Olympic spirit finally literally reached all corners of the world.” 
This may raise a question, though, regarding whether it was fair to ostracize the 
PRC with a billion population for the ROC with a much-smaller 8 million population. This 
question can be explained with several reasons. First, although the IOC practiced the 
utilitarian idea of “sports for all goods,” it was fairly deontological when the issue was 
sport participation itself. As much as the IOC hoped to involve the PRC, the PRC was not 
more important than Taiwan because of its greater population. In addition, with the PRC 
recognized by most countries in the world, once the IOC expelled the ROC completely 
from the Olympic Movement, Taiwanese athletes would technically be shut out 
permanently, too.14 The best option might be to seek both parties’ co-existence within the 
Olympic Movement while retaining the less powerful one.                
3.2.2 The Additional Rival of Both PRC and ROC  
While the IOC was all about the Olympic Movement, both the PRC and the ROC 
had their respective goals beyond simply joining in the Olympic Movement. They 
                                                 
14 There are two situations: (1) if Taiwan remains a de facto independent country, China would prevent 
Taiwan from regaining a seat in the IOC in the future, and it would be nearly impossible for Taiwanese 
athletes to join the Chinese sport teams. (2) Even if China and Taiwan “reunited,” Taiwan would be another 
Special Administrative Region, like Hong Kong and Macau and organize its own team to participate in 
international sport events. Hong Kong is able to send its own team to these events because it was recognized 
by the IOC when it was still a colony of the UK, but Macau, a former colony of Portugal which hadn’t got 
an NOC recognized by the IOC, was not able to participate in the Olympic Games as a part of China. It is 
likely that Taiwan be treated in the same way as Macau was. 
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considered the efforts they had made for the seat sports diplomacy, which served high 
politics. The IOC’s indifference to their purpose beyond sport made the supreme authority 
of the Olympic Movement another rival of both parties (in addition to each other). 
The PRC had been proclaiming to be the only legitimate representative of China 
since the Communist Party seized mainland China, but was not recognized by half of the 
countries in the world, especially the Western world. The two reasons for its initial 
involvement in the Olympic Games were that the Soviet Union needed participation of 
more Communist countries to exhibit the superiority of Communism, and that the PRC was 
eager to replace the ROC in the international society. However, they were not the IOC’s 
concern. Lacking pragmatism and flexibility, the ideologically idealistic Communist China 
considered itself victimized by a Western-affiliated and -manipulated IOC. In his letter 
exchange with Brundage, Dong attacked the then IOC President for his “reactionary acts” 
and for being a “faithful menial of the U.S. imperialists” (Brownell, 2005). An official at 
the State Sport Commission at that time, Dong’s wording definitely represented the official 
opinion of the Chinese government. What’s more, since Brundage was defending the 
decisions of the IOC, the IOC was also perceived as a reactionary international 
organization to denounce, which not only declined the will of the Chinese people to 
participate in the Olympic Games, but also attempted to internationally sabotage the fruit 
of the Chinese Communist revolution. ACSF officially withdrew from the IOC in 1958 in 
protest to the fabrication of two Chinas in the international sport community.  
 If the tension out of which the withdrawal took place was not severe enough to be 
rivalry, the establishment of the short-lived GANEFO was absolutely a war declaration 
from the PRC to the IOC. The GANEFO Movement began because of the PRC, gained full 
political and financial support from the PRC, and was led by the PRC while dwindling 
down. Its history introduced in Chapter 2, the GANEFO was anti-Olympics in its nature. 
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The PRC, the biggest patron of the GANEFO, explicitly aimed at countering the IOC in all 
aspects, especially at the non-politicization principle of the Olympic Movement (Pauker, 
1965; Connolly, 2012).  
The IOC fought back immediately. No IOC-recognized NOCs were allowed to send 
teams to the GANEFO, so most other participants of the GANEFO only sent non-Olympic 
caliber athletes. The PRC, its NOC an outcast from the IOC, and Indonesia, the founder of 
the Games, were the only ones which barely had anything to lose.15 In consequence, the 
biggest supporter and sponsor of the GANEFO ended up with the best athletic performance 
as well. However, other participants’ tepid attitude toward the Games and instable political 
situation in the “New Emerging Forces” withered the GANEFO, and the beginning of the 
Cultural Revolution completely absorbed the PRC and eventually gave the diseasing 
newborn GANEFO the last strike. The years of the GANEFO witnessed the PRC 
demonstrate power and gain prestige among the Third World, but it did not help solve the 
problem of two Chinas (Lutan & Fan, 2005). Not until years later, when the Cultural 
Revolution drew near to its end, did the PRC, having replaced the ROC as the widely 
recognized China, commence the rapprochement with the IOC.  
The ROC behaved even more dramatically in the long rally with the IOC. Having 
lost most of the Chinese territory and retreated to Taiwan, whose status is still undecided 
today, the Nationalist regime, partly because of the support and recognition of the US and 
other major Western countries, did not downplay its claim to be the sole legitimate Chinese 
government. Nor was the idea of an independent Taiwan really shaped at that time. 
Consequently, when the IOC issued an invitation to the NOCs of both the PRC and the 
ROC, the latter reacted intensely. From then on, every time the IOC attempted to include 
                                                 
15 “Barely” is used here because Indonesia, despite its fury against the IOC, didn’t go completely against the 
IOC and even tried to participate in the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games.  
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the PRC, even without agreeing to expel the ROC’s Olympic Committee, the ROC always 
firmly denounced the decisions or attempts of the IOC by declaring a withdrawal, 
threatening to withdraw, or boycotting the Olympic Games. Between the founding of the 
PRC in 1949 and its NOC’s reinstatement into the Olympic Movement in 1979, the ROC 
boycotted the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games and 1976 Montreal Olympic Games. When 
entering the stadium at the opening ceremony of the 1960 Rome Olympics, Taiwanese 
athletes protested the name change by exhibiting banners with political demonstration, 
“UNDER PROTEST” (Lord Killanin, 1983, p.103). In protest to the Nagoya Resolution, 
the ROC continued to boycott the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympic Games and the 1980 
Moscow Olympic Games,16 until the name change was finally accepted and Taiwanese 
athletes participated in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games for the first time under the 
name of Chinese Taipei. After the IOC’s dual recognition in 1954, the President of the 
ROC’s Olympic Committee immediately held a press conference and announced the 
ROC’s exit from the Olympic Movement, weeping (Liang, 2007, p.40). However, the 
announcements or threats of withdrawal had never really come true until 1976.  
The ROC, through the Taiwanese IOC member, Henry Hsu, also filed lawsuits 
against the IOC in Swiss court in 1979, appealing to nullify the Nagoya Resolution, only 
to get rejected (Pound, 2012). It also filed a lawsuit against the Lake Placid Olympic Games 
Organizing Committee in US court, protesting against the change of name, flag and anthem 
as the premise of Taiwan’s participation in the 1980 Winter Olympic Games. The state trial 
supported Taiwan’s claim but the decision was overturned after cross-appeal (Liang, 2007, 
p.188). The IOC won all legal battles.  
                                                 
16 More accurately, the Taiwanese athletes arrived at the US for the Olympic Games, but got denied entry 
because of their adherence to “Republic of China” as the team name. 
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Therefore, the IOC’s rivalry with the ROC was different from that with the PRC. 
The PRC’s NOC was not recognized by the IOC until 1979. It had nothing to lose. Branding 
itself as the leader of the developing countries and the loyal member of the Communist 
bloc, the PRC went as far as forming the GANEFO in attempt to sabotage the Olympic 
Movement. Its action was driven by both Communist ideology and pragmatic political 
consideration. The ROC, having just lost control of the mainland China, on the contrary, 
had to do whatever it would take to overwhelm the PRC in the international community. 
The seat of the ROC’s Olympic Committee in the IOC was perceived by the ROC as a 
matter of survival, especially after it was replaced by the PRC in the United Nations in 
1971. Its allies not interested in mixing sports with politics,17 the ROC had to struggle 
mostly on its own in this game. It played the victim card and resorted to legal means, and 
even turned its only IOC member against the IOC—while all three parties were hard-liners, 
the ROC was also a dramatic player. Interestingly, although the PRC and the ROC 
themselves were the real opponents, they showed commensurate intransigence when it 
came to political issues, or issues they considered political. However, they failed to 
overwhelm the IOC—the latter successfully smothered the newborn GANEFO, and won 
the three lawsuits in Switzerland and the United States.       
3.2.3 Mediator 
The IOC’s position in this process and its role as the promoter of the Olympic 
Movement made it inevitable for the IOC to provide good offices between the PRC and 
the ROC. Successful as it was in combatting the challenges and threats from both, the IOC 
was not a good mediator between the two confronting parties, in terms of the outcome after 
                                                 
17 This statement may be more credible if it goes as “not interested mixing sports with the politics not related 
to themselves,” because the United States immediately led a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games 
after the solution of the Two Chinas Question. 
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all endeavors. The major reason was that the IOC, unwilling to solve the political dispute 
and lacking the power to terminate it completely, wanted only to solve the sport problem, 
especially the Olympic Games participation, but both the PRC and the ROC politicized 
every issue that could be and placed national interest ahead of the sport rights of their 
people—they could not know better. 
Neither the PRC nor the ROC would meet and talk with the other, so the initial 
talks were purely bilateral between the IOC and either the PRC or the ROC. Before the 
withdrawal from the IOC and most international sport federations in 1958, the PRC sent 
an official delegation to the IOC sessions and joint meetings of the Executive Board and 
the NOCs in Paris, Athens, and Rome, etc. The ROC also had delegates, but both avoided 
meeting each other. Even though the ROC physically sat out, the PRC could not tolerate 
that the ROC’s name was on the IOC’s official roster and made its debut in the IOC 
meetings a series of protests, which were considered political by the IOC members. In the 
meanwhile, the Taiwanese IOC member, Hsiang-His Kung never showed up in IOC 
sessions, and the pro-ROC IOC member, Cheng-Ting Wang, seldom did. The President of 
ROC’s Olympic Committee attended and made a report in the 1954 Session, but was also 
considered politically biased because he was not an IOC member (Fan & Xiong, 2003, 
p.261).    
Lord Killanin showed more willingness and resolution to proactively solve the Two 
Chinas Question after he succeeded Brundage as the IOC President even though the PRC, 
undergoing the Cultural Revolution and extremely politically radical, was rather passive 
and aloof. Lord Killanin proposed three-party round talks twice. The first time was when 
he visited Beijing in 1977, but Beijing considered it politically wrong to even simply attend 
an IOC meeting, let alone negotiate with the “Chiang clique” from Taiwan (Liang, 2007, 
p.143). Two years later, when the less-radical PRC finally agreed to direct dialogues in 
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1979, Taiwan refused (Liang, 2007, p.166). Meanwhile, Lord Killanin also authorized 
three IOC members, Lance Cross, Alexandru Spierco and Roy Bridge, to form a China 
commission to look into the problem. Beijing first required that they should not enter China 
under the name of China commission,18 and then opposed that the IOC members continue 
to visit Taiwan.   
In the end, Lord Killanin, determined to solve the problem, gave up the IOC’s 
neutral position, and sided with Beijing. Abandoning the mediator role was not 
unreasonable. The PRC had replaced the ROC as the sole representative in the United 
Nations for years—the fact was acknowledged among the IOC members as well and gave 
the PRC the upper hand—but reluctant as the IOC was to exclude the Taiwanese athletes 
from the Olympic Movement, the ROC side was unyieldingly clinging to the “one-China 
policy,” where it ironically converged with the PRC. The more widely recognized the PRC 
was, the less conducive the ROC’s stance was for the IOC to solve the problem and to save 
its own seat in the Olympic Movement. Soon the ROC consented to dual recognition. The 
IOC’s deviation from the neutral mediator role actually contributed to the eventual 
Resolution—the Chinese Olympic Committee from the PRC got in, and the ROC’s 
Olympic Committee boycotted the Olympic Games after the name change request but 
finally accepted its fate.          
As the supreme authority of the Olympic Movement, the IOC wanted to solve the 
Two Chinas Question as much within the realm of sport as possible. However, this issue 
was considered by both the PRC and the ROC a hardcore political issue, which was beyond 
the IOC’s control. Nor was it the IOC’s responsibility to reconcile the hostility and 
incompatibility of the two battling regimes. Therefore, it is understandable that the IOC 
                                                 
18 Non-interference with internal affairs has always been one of the PRC’s principles for foreign policy. The 
PRC would not yield state sovereignty even nominally to “foreign power.” 
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was not a successful mediator and gave up the role. In addition, thanks to the zero-
flexibility of both the PRC and the ROC, the politically neutral IOC became a rival for both 
Chinese government. Then the IOC surrendered its non-politics principle, examined the 
factual world politics, and stood with the PRC—the totally disadvantaged ROC had to 
choose the only option it was offered for survival. The Chinese Olympic Committee was 
recognized, the Taiwanese athletes’ right to participate in the Olympic Games was 
successfully protected (though not without risks)—the problem was solved. 
3.3 DECISION-MAKING AND INDIVIDUAL POWER 
The IOC decisions are ultimately made through the vote of the IOC members, who 
are individuals that represent the Olympic Movement worldwide. It is clearly stated in Item 
16.1.4 in the Olympic Charter (IOC, 2014a) that, 
Members of the IOC represent and promote the interests of the IOC and of the 
Olympic Movement in their countries and in the organisations of the Olympic 
Movement in which they serve. (p. 33) 
This item decides that, theoretically, the IOC members vote for the sake of the 
Olympic Movement only, and an IOC resolution reflects the will of the majority of the 
individual IOC members. However, as the IOC member scatter all over the world, and are 
convened only for the IOC sessions annually, the Executive Board, which consists of 
fitfteen IOC members,19 can be convened by the President or upon the request of the 
majority and discuss critical or emergent affairs. As aforementioned, the draft of the 
Nagoya Resolution was the product of the Executive Board meeting in Nagoya, Japan, and 
the following vote among the IOC member was conducted by mail. With regard to the 
                                                 
19 The Executive Board consists of the President, four Vice Presidents, and ten selected IOC members. 
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battle of the PRC and the ROC, the power of individuals played an important role, and 
largely set the rules of the game. 
3.3.1 The IOC Members 
At the beginning, to the PRC and its delegates’ disappointment, the IOC members 
from the Communist countries didn’t represent their home countries’ stance well enough, 
while those from the western countries didn’t deviate far enough from theirs. In a word, 
almost nobody wanted to (western) or, even if they wanted to, dared to (Communist bloc) 
talk about politics. Despite the disparate views on sport-politics relations, the IOC members 
were willing to recognized the PRC’s NOC—as aforementioned, more than half of the IOC 
members attending the 1953 Mexico City Session voted in favor of the ACSF’s 
recognition—but they didn’t want to see Taiwanese athletes excluded from the Olympic 
Movement, especially when the Communist government didn’t have de facto jurisdiction 
over Taiwan.  
An IOC member as an individual owned more freedom than a governmental 
representative. For governments and their representatives, if they established diplomatic 
relations with the PRC, they must recognize that there was but one China and that Taiwan 
was part of China, and revoke the established official relation, if any, with the Nationalist 
government in Taiwan. But theoretically an IOC member didn’t have such an obligation to 
cater to the political interests of a certain country because of its bold and radical political 
assertions, even if they were recognized by the member’s home country. 
The fact that the IOC members voted as individuals, however, also meant that they 
could be persuaded, especially by their fellow members. This is true with the Two Chinas 
Question case, especially in the 1970s—some IOC members played significant roles as 
individual messengers and mediators, such as Spierco from Romania, Tsuneyoshi from 
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Japan, Prince Gholam from Iran, and Juan Antonio Samaranch from Spain, etc. It was also 
partly because the PRC began to understand the decision-making mechanisms within the 
IOC. It learned to use the help of pro-PRC IOC members to deliver messages and gather 
information. These IOC members also helped soften the PRC’s position and persuaded the 
PRC to make compromise. 
In addition, Henry Hsu from Taiwan was named IOC member in 1970, which 
rendered the whole situation a deadlock (Lord Killanin, 1983, pp.103-104). Even though 
he was never in the Executive Board, he remained loyal to the Nationalist government of 
the ROC in Taiwan. He was an even more significant figure when the ROC sued the IOC 
in a local court in Lausanne, because only a member of an organization could sue the 
organization according to Swiss law. Even though the ROC didn’t win the lawsuit, it is 
another case where individual power overwhelmed state power within the IOC.      
3.3.2 The Executive Board  
The Executive Board of the IOC not only set the agenda of the IOC sessions, but 
also met more frequently to discuss IOC issues. Thus, the subjects are most sufficiently 
talked about and debated over within the Executive Board. Moreover, five of the fifteen 
members of the Executive Board are the President and the Vice Presidents, and the other 
ten are elected by all members. They have either higher status and thus greater influence, 
or higher reputation, or both within the IOC and can be the game changer. In this case, all 
progress was made in the Executive Board meetings, 
 Lord Killannin presented his trip to Beijing in the 1977 Executive Board meeting. 
 The China Commission was formed in the 1978 Executive Board meeting. 
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 Representatives from both the PRC and the ROC respectively made representations 
at the Executive Meeting in Lausanne, Switzerland, March 1979, and at the Executive 
Meeting during the Montevideo Session in April.  
 A new resolution favoring the PRC was drafted by a working group authorized by 
the Executive Board meeting in San Juan in June 1979. No consensus was reached. 
 The draft resolution was unanimously agreed upon in the Executive Board meeting 
in Nagoya in October 1979. The resolution passed the postal vote by IOC members. 
The direct communication between the IOC and either the PRC’s or the ROC’s 
delegation was made through the Executive Board meeting. The development went back 
and forth—but it was obvious that the objection within the Executive Board impeded the 
process more than that outside the Board. As long as the Board reached consensus on a 
resolution on the Two Chinas Question, the resolution passed. But if there was not 
unanimity within the Board, no substantial progress could be achieved. Besides, the 
Executive Board also balanced the President’s personal view, especially when the 
President went too far with it—this function was better served during Lord Killanin’s terms 
(Lord Killanin, 1983, pp.103-107). 
3.3.3 The President(s) 
It is noticeable that the Presidents had enormous influence throughout the IOC. 
With regard to the Two Chinas Question, the President’s attitude directly influenced, if not 
decided, the trajectory of the question’s development. It is acknowledged that the 
resolution was more contingent on the PRC’s and the ROC’s willingness to make 
concessions, but the IOC did present two disparate positions when dealing with the PRC. 
Brundage’s IOC was driven to be an idealistic sport utopia, detached from world politics 
but destined to enter a deadlock, when clashing with the radical PRC. Lord Killanin’s IOC 
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was more pragmatic, and of course, deliberately surrendered a smattering of the non-
politicization principle for the desired outcome. 
The two Presidents were so powerful within the organization that many turning 
points were related to their personal decisions. Avery Brundage pushed both parties so hard 
not to talk politics that it virtually became a non-starter for solving the Two Chinas 
Question during his presidency. After Taiwan’s announcement of withdrawal from the 
Olympic Movement in 1954, Brundage put “Republic of China” back into the list of 
recognized NOCs, which officially had the Two Chinas Question internalized into 
international sport community. His ideal of apolitical sport enraged both parties and their 
sympathizers—the PRC couldn’t tolerate the creation of two Chinas, criticized it as 
hypocrisy and withdrew in 1958, and the ROC’s Olympic Committee was forced to change 
its name for the first time because the government did not have jurisdiction over mainland 
China anymore.20 In addition, Henry Hsu from Taiwan became an IOC member solely 
because Brundage wanted him to—it was yet another privilege of the President: as a 
tradition, Executive Board members did not raise differing opinions from the president at 
the Session (Lord Killanin, 1983, pp.103-104). 
Lord Killanin, on the contrary, showed his determination to solve the problem, once 
and for good. The IOC had been more proactive on having the NOC of the PRC recognized 
than the PRC itself until 1977. He personally paid a visit to Beijing and communicated 
with the Chinese officials when the IOC and the PRC still lacked formal interactions. He 
also led the IOC slightly off the non-politicization principle of the Olympic Movement, 
and took advantage of the world politics—the PRC’s seat in the UN became a reference, 
and the Irish went as far as to design a plan in which a disadvantaged Taiwan would have 
                                                 
20 The Taiwanese team was registered as Formosa China in the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games, and 
competed as Taiwan in the 1960 Rome Olympic Games. Then it went on to compete as the Republic of China 
again in 1968 and 1972. 
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to accept the proposed name change and give up its flag and anthem. Lord Killanin was a 
successful pro-PRC strategist.  
3.4 NON-POLITICIZATION AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
The different approaches that the two IOC Presidents respectively adopted to solve 
the Two Chinas Question and their respective outcomes illustrated the IOC’s dilemma—
the IOC was a conceptually apolitical sport organization, but without considering or taking 
advantage of world politics, it was improbable to reach its primary goal of promoting the 
Olympic Movement globally. Even though Avery Brundage might not have realized it or 
went to great lengths to eliminate it, politics always existed, and from the moment Lord 
Killanin inquired the United Nations about the international recognition of the PRC and 
the ROC, the IOC consciously deviated from political unbiasedness and eventually 
terminated the political issue by political means. 
It has always been included in the first principle in the Olympic Charter that no 
discrimination is allowed based on politics or against a person’s political affiliation. 
Keeping the Olympic Games from politics has also been listed as one of the IOC’s 
missions. Hill (1992, p.31) argued that the IOC was not only unable to isolate itself from 
the influence of world politics, but also had greater political involvement than other sport 
organizations because of its higher public exposure. However, the political influence in the 
title of this section refers to proactive political involvement which influenced the IOC in 
decision-making rather than passive political involvement that was imposed to the IOC, 
such as the mutual boycotts of the United States and the USSR. This section is intended to 
analyze whether and how political was incorporated by the IOC in the solving process of 
the Two Chinas Question. The use of politics of the IOC, the Olympic Movement’s 
supreme authority where politics was proscribed, is worth more examination than that of 
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the PRC and the ROC, two authoritarian governments whose colorization of their 
participation in the Olympic Movement was not unexpected. 
3.4.1 IOC Members Were More than Individuals   
Although the IOC members are individual decision makers, they have their own 
political opinions and ideals. Even if an issue is not directly related to certain IOC 
members’ political interests, they view it from a perspective that reflected the culture they 
were brought up in, the education they received, and political indoctrination from 
significant others and political authorities. That is, when the IOC needs to make a decision 
either related to political issues or with political implications, the IOC members’ ballots 
indeed come from individuals, but are, at the same time, the end products of the formal and 
informal political education these individuals have received. 
Moreover, a number of IOC members are or used to be governmental officials, or 
are de facto government representatives. This is especially true with the IOC members from 
authoritarian nations. Since the very beginning of the PRC’s pursuit of IOC recognition, 
the IOC members from the Eastern Bloc were supporters, and Konstantin Andrianov, the 
IOC member from the Soviet Union and a Communist Party member, was literally tutoring 
the PRC delegation about conduct codes and protocols (mainly about talking less politics) 
in the 1955 IOC Session in Paris, France (Liang, 2007, pp.41-44). Spierco, the Romanian 
member of the three-person China commission, was forbidden by his government to visit 
Taiwan (Lord Killanin, 1983, p.105). On behalf of Taiwan’s Olympic Committee, the 
Taiwanese IOC member, Henry Hsu, virtually sued the IOC, the organization which he 
was supposed to defend. What’s worse, Taiwan’s Olympic Committee was manipulated 
by the Nationalist Government, and the government directly instructed Hsu on the ROC’s 
strategy (Lord Killanin, 1983, p.105; Huang & Wang, 2013). Not unexpectedly, Zhenliang 
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He, the first IOC member from the PRC and a Communist Party member, also followed 
the instructions from the CPC and the Chinese government after he was elected (Li, 2009, 
pp.82-89). 
As the IOC President is the most influential figure within the organization, her/his 
political stance is also more influential. Brundage attempted to drive the IOC as far away 
from political issue as possible. On the Two Chinas Question, the strategy Brundage 
adopted was that the political dispute should not seek solution within a sport organization 
and the IOC only deals with sportsmen’s participation in the Olympic Games—the PRC’s 
explicitly political appeal was declined by the Executive Board members. Years later, when 
the PRC had withdrawn, the jurisdiction that the ROC’s Olympic Committee claimed to 
own was put into question, and a name change was requested. That being said, Brundage 
was suspected to be pro-ROC by his successor, Lord Killanin, because of non-punishment 
against ROC’s political demonstration in the 1960 Rome Olympic Games and the 
nomination of Henry Hsu for IOC member. On the contrary, Lord Killanin (1983, pp.101-
109), in his memoir, provided the rationale for all his efforts to include the PRC, which 
was “the curious anomaly that the country with the world’s largest population did not take 
part in the Olympic Games, and I wanted to change this.” This view pushed him to lead 
the IOC to find a solution proactively.      
3.4.2 External Liaisons  
Out Lord Killanin reached. The IOC had not have an official reference for political 
matters, but the inquiry about China’s situation was sent to the United Nations. The UN’s 
reply was in favor of the PRC, and was acknowledged by the IOC members. Likewise, 
although Julian Roosevelt was not related to the United States government, the IOC 
member from the U.S. consulted the status of the PRC and the ROC with the U.S. State 
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Department in 1979 after the U.S. and the PRC established diplomatic relation, and again, 
the reply was in favor of the PRC (IOC, 1979b). The politically neutral IOC finally took 
external political authorities’ opinion into consideration instead of making judgment all by 
itself. 
Lord Killanin also communicated with the PRC frequently, the other side mostly 
government officials. He visited Taiwan in 1978 and was enraged by the political 
obstructions exerted by the ROC side (Lord Killanin, 1983, p.105-106). He went so far as 
to communicate plans and tactics with the PRC side, hoping that Taiwan, if not accepting 
the request for name change, could be forced to withdraw from the IOC. The IOC members 
also have connections with external political bodies. Not only the aforementioned a few 
Asian and Eastern Bloc IOC members sided with the PRC, but the ROC also had 
sympathizers, such as Lance Cross and many other members from the Commonwealth. 
The Two Chinas Question came to an end at last but even Lord Killanin (1983, p.107) 
admitted in his memoir that the Olympic Movement made compromise.    
3.5 CONCLUSION 
When Pierre de Coubertin established the IOC, he wished the Olympic Movement 
was politics-free. However, even though it was regulated that the competition was between 
individuals rather than between nations, athletes were organized and sent by NOCs. As the 
Olympic Movement gained publicity and influence, it naturally became a battlefield for 
sovereign nations. When the IOC was forced to be involved in the battles, it was confronted 
with a choice, whether to adhere to principles or to mingle with reality. Brundage chose 
the former, attempted to isolate the IOC from the vicissitudes of world politics and avoided 
to play a role in the game. However, the Olympic Movement lost the world’s most 
populated country and gained an opponent, the GANEFO (though short-lived). Lord 
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Killanin chose the latter, helped the PRC return, and forced Taiwan’s Olympic Committee 
to change name, but sacrificed the principles of the Olympic Movement. Which was 
supposed to be righteous way is a philosophical question, which is beyond the discussion 
in this thesis, but the latter helped the Olympic Movement win back China, which has been 
exploiting the political value of the Olympic Games till today. Olympic ideals are divine 
and desirable, but as Epsy (1981, p.163-164) argued, politics was an intrinsic part of 
international sport, which definitely included the Olympic Movement—this argument 
makes the compromise of Lord Killanin less pitiful. 
Obviously, Brundage and Lord Killanin were the two most significant figures 
within the IOC with regard to the Two Chinas Question. The Presidents’ attitude and 
personal view actually decided the IOC’s approach to deal with the problem. Of course, 
the Presidents, despite their privilege, needed to earn the support of the Executive Board, 
which met more frequently than ordinary IOC members and discussed matters more deeply 
and thoroughly. Then it was all the IOC members’ turn to vote on a draft resolution. They 
were individuals from all over the world. Some of them represented or were manipulated 
by their governments, but more stood more independently. The individual IOC members 
didn’t have their governments’ obligation: they didn’t have to negate one of the “two 
Chinas” while recognizing the other, but their willingness to include both was inacceptable 
for both parties. 
The IOC didn’t sit in the headquarters in Lausanne and make members vote. In the 
1960s, it fought back when the radical PRC and suspended Indonesia founded a rivaling 
Games and smothered the infant GANEFO. In the 1970s, the IOC became more 
constructive and pragmatic and tried to offer good offices for the PRC and the ROC. 
However, even though both parties had explicit political interests to seek, they refused to 
pay by making compromise. Meanwhile, the Two Chinas Question gradually cleared up in 
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the international society and the situation favored China. The IOC, under Lord Killanin’s 
leadership, favored the more widely recognized PRC, and successfully forced Taiwan’s 
Olympic Committee to change its name—athletes from both mainland China and Taiwan 
could participate in the Olympic Games. Thus, the Two Chinas Question was solved in the 
Olympic Movement. By then, the IOC had played the role of the promoter of the Olympic 
Movement, the protector of athletes, the rival of the PRC and the ROC, and the mediator. 
It was not an unfair deal to surrender a plethora of the non-politicization principle, which 
had not been completely observed anyways, to reach the goal of including the world’s 
largest population group into the Olympic Movement and gain more influence worldwide.  
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Chapter 4:  The Olympic Movement: More a Winner than a Victim 
The political involvement of the IOC and the Olympic Movement, mostly of a 
passive nature, dates back as early as the 1930s, when Nazi Germany exhibited its state 
power and presumed superiority by hosting the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games (Keys, 2006). 
After WWII, the Olympic Movement and Olympism were victimized or claimed to be by 
the Cold War spillover, East Germany’s organized doping scandal, the USA and the 
USSR’s mutual boycott, and, most recently, China’s massive human rights abuse. The 
battle between the PRC and the ROC for the exclusive right to represent China in the 
Olympic Movement was no exception—not only was the IOC dragged into the swirl of 
political disputes, but it also had to solve this political matter within the sport field by 
political means.  
Before the 1970s, the IOC went to great lengths to shun the forced obligation of 
judging the two battling parties. Well-intended and idealistic as the IOC and the then 
President, Avery Brundage, might be, the IOC enraged both and their supporters and was 
widely criticized. Whether or not the purity of Olympism protected still unknown, the 
Olympic Movement was denied entry into the world’s most populated nation for almost 
three decades. By no means was the perseverance implausible, but as many have observed, 
it is impossible that the Olympic Movement, born and burgeoning in the human society, 
part with world politics (Epsy, 1981; Hill, 1992; Keys, 2006).  
In the 1970s, the IOC, with a proactive President, adopted a pragmatic approach to 
solve the problem within the decade. As Lord Killanin admitted, the Olympic Movement 
surrendered its principle. Politics surely eroded Olympism. Yet the Olympic Movement 
finally covered almost all the inhabited lands in this planet, impacted most of the world 
population, and, more importantly, succeeded in retaining the athletes both from mainland 
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China and Taiwan within its realm. The political obstructions the ROC authority created 
were cleared, and the NOC in Taiwan ceased to purport to preside over all China’s sports 
activities, which it actually had not done for decades. The PRC’s NOC, now Chinese 
Olympic Committee, was recognized, and the PRC authority made a “concession 
impossible” and allowed Taiwan’s Olympic Committee to stay in the IOC and have the 
same status de jure as its own.21  
Therefore, throughout the twenty-eight years’ politicized battle in sport, the 
Olympic Movement and its supreme authority, the IOC, was undoubtedly a big winner. 
The IOC even made extra-sport contribution: “the Olympic Formula” enabled the de facto 
autonomous but diplomatically derecognized Taiwan to participate in international events 
and organizations under the name of Chinese Taipei (Chan, 2002). The IOC was made the 
winner because of both the organizational characteristics and the world political climate.                      
4.1 AUTONOMY KEPT THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT AT BAY 
The IOC was such “a self-electing, self-regulating body, consisting on the whole of 
individuals,” that corruption and bribery scandals were finally exposed at the turn of 
century (Hill, 1992, p.56). MacAloon (2011) argues, however, if not for its autonomous 
and non-intergovernmental characteristics, the organization would not survive the Cold 
War. Likewise, it is the IOC’s autonomy based on the Olympic Charter and individual 
members that kept the IOC as far as possible from the threats and attempted hijacking, 
especially the political ones. Fairly covering almost all aspects of the Olympic Movement 
governance, the Olympic Charter was the basis for autonomy and the constitution of the 
Olympic realm. The IOC members, representative of the Olympic Movement rather than 
                                                 
21 The PRC, of course, interprets differently and claims that the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee is 
subordinate to the Chinese Olympic Committee. 
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of their own countries, were the guardians of the movement’s independence and 
unbiasedness.   
If the IOC members had been government delegates, debates and votes themselves 
would have become political races despite the non-politicization principle. The IOC 
members would have taken the views of their respective governments and voted according 
to governmental instructions—the IOC would have been paralyzed, the Olympic 
Movement completely kidnapped by political agenda. It would have been extremely 
unlikely that non-politicization principle be practiced if governments had been directly 
involved. The short-lived GANEFO, which was founded under the slogan that sports and 
politics were inseparable, was a proof that an intergovernmental sport organization could 
not survive political disputes. Thanks to total autonomy, the IOC did not become a total 
battlefield where all nations could fight overtly for political interests. 
The IOC members were repulsed by the PRC and the ROC’s attempted 
manipulation over the autonomous organization. When both did so, the seemingly more 
aggressive party had to accept arrested development. The treatment only worsened when 
the President felt this way. The political obstructions the ROC created expedited Lord 
Killanin’s deviation from neutrality, and it was even more so when the PRC’s ignorance 
of the Olympism infuriated Brundage.  
Avery Brundage was extremely firm that sports had nothing to do with politics. 
According to the commonly held view of sport-politics relation above, his insistence and 
endeavor might seem naive, as argued by Espy (1981, pp.175-198). But it was not. It was 
necessary for the IOC to keep sports from political infringement. Absolute as he sounded, 
Brundage had done exactly what his seemingly more realistic successor, Lord Killanin, 
asserted—sport cannot shun politics completely, but it is necessary to protect sport from 
political exploitation (IOC, 1974, pp.572-574). What’s more, the inevitable entanglements 
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of sports with politics only made it more urgent to check the political powers’ use of them 
and to prevent the avoidable ones. The non-politicization principle was so well-received 
that talking politics explicitly, both from the PRC and the ROC, was unwelcomed and 
resented. Even the IOC member from the USSR, who was pro-China, had to check the 
harshness and pungency of the PRC delegation’s political proclamation. One educated 
guess is that, for the Soviet Union’s long-term goal of a political nature, Konstatin 
Andrianov, the member from the USSR, had to observe the IOC rules so that he was not 
isolated by the majority. Also it was the USSR’s hope that the PRC’s NOC could be 
recognized earlier by downplaying political proclamation, as a result of which the 
Communist Bloc could be stronger within the Olympic Movement. That is, in pursuit of 
political outcomes, the Soviet member must obey and enforce the IOC regulation to secure 
the nation’s participation above all.  
The solution of the Two Chinas Question became stagnant in Brundage’s terms, 
but just because of the deadlock, the PRC realized the incompatibility of the PRC’s explicit 
political purpose and the IOC’s sport-oriented stance. In the 1970s, instead of assertively 
preaching the position of the PRC government and overtly attempting to subvert the IOC’s 
authority, the PRC adopted a less aggressive approach to solve the IOC seat problem. The 
PRC’s sport officials approached and persuaded a number of IOC members one by one. It 
was not an easy step. The IOC members were not governmental representatives and did 
not have the duty to carry out governmental policies, as a result of which, it was not of 
much use to influence their opinions through their respective governments, despite the 
PRC’s intransigent opposition against two Chinas in any diplomatic relation. On the 
contrary, many IOC members, out of responsibility to protect the Olympic Movement and 
sport practitioners, sought a feasible way to retain Taiwanese athletes while favoring 
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Beijing’s seat. It was during the interactions with the IOC members that the PRC began to 
consider the alternatives of expelling Taiwan and finally made compromise. 
4.2 DEUS EX MACHINA: THE IOC EMBRACED FLEXIBILITY  
Although the rationale given above renders Brundage’s unbending attitude 
reasonable and even plausible from an idealist perspective, the Olympic Movement did not 
benefit directly from the IOC taking a hard line. Correspondingly, in spite of the admitted 
surrender of the Olympism, nothing substantial did the IOC lose with Lord Killanin’s 
pragmatic path. Rather, the Olympic Movement won over China, and retained Taiwan. 
Thus, it is legitimate to interpret the IOC’s compromise as its embrace with flexibility, the 
key to the Two Chinas Question. 
4.2.1 Seeking a Fourth-Party Authority: The United Nations  
Lord Killanin’s starting point was not a political one. He deemed that the anomaly 
that the world’s largest population group was not in the Olympic Movement should be 
changed. Although he personally doubted the PRC’s claimed jurisdiction over Taiwan, 
recognized both Chinese governments, and hated to have political agenda involved in his 
organization, he was determined to solve the problem (Lord Killanin, 1983, pp.101-109). 
Official consultation was made with the United Nation for the status of the PRC and the 
ROC—the IOC sought the most reliable and unbiased external authority available for 
reference.22 When both parties were exerting political pressure to the IOC, the IOC chose 
to let the fourth-party authority judge—that could be the political solution to the political 
dispute, and the IOC could be the solution user rather than the solution maker. 
                                                 
22 Avery Brundage used to refer to recognition in the UN, too, but it was in his letter communication with 
IOC members rather than an official inquiry. 
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However, the political solution outside the IOC did not cover the sport field. It was 
not a perfect one—Taiwanese people, still governed by an independent government greatly 
derecognized by the international community, were isolated from global issues (Lee, 
1999). The PRC’s Olympic Committee, de facto affiliated to the government, tried to claim 
jurisdiction over sport activities in Taiwan, trying to erase the name of the ROC or Taiwan 
from the non-intergovernmental but influential IOC, while the ROC’s Olympic Committee, 
whose tie with the government was no less strong, took advantage of the IOC’s non-
intergovernmental feature, attempting to make the ROC survive the diplomatic isolation 
and suppression from the PRC. Therefore, the seat replacement in the United Nations did 
not end the political battle in the IOC—only a permanent solution of Taiwan’s status would 
help, but that was extremely unlikely (not even now). It would be a shame if the diplomatic 
isolation extended to the Olympic Movement. Compromise was made for the second time, 
and the IOC gained more flexibility on this issue. 
4.2.2 The IOC Became a Player in the Political Game 
Both the stagnancy in the Brundage era and the passive attitude of both parties 
proved over and over that the PRC and the ROC had politicized the Two Chinas Question 
in the IOC so much that they not only refused to put politics aside, but also colorized any 
effort of the IOC to divorce the Olympic Movement and political infringement. The IOC 
had no choice but to proactively engage in this matter, since Lord Killanin aimed to settle 
the dispute in the short term. It picked up the player role, which had been tossed over by 
the other two parties for a long time, and began to play the game instead of shunning. 
The IOC was such a good player that the outcome, the Nagoya Resolution, was 
hardly a political one. Although Espy (1981, p.188) sided with New York State Supreme 
Court Judge Norman Harvey and agreed that the IOC had made a political decision, the 
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decision did not generate direct and substantial influence in world politics, nor was the IOC 
involved in derivative political disputes. The IOC adopted a political means in exchange 
for the non-political result. For example, in the Communist China’s saying, the Chinese 
commission’s investigation, visit to Taiwan, or even its existence, was an unwelcomed 
intervention with the nation’s internal affairs. This case again proved the inevitability of 
professing politics—the sport governance on both sides was so political that the 
Commission mingled with government officials and deviated from political neutrality. In 
Liang’s (2007) biography of Zhenliang He, the China commission and the PRC agreed 
upon several common points as follows, 
1) There is only one China in the world, and that is the People's Republic of China. 
2) Taiwan is a part of China, and the Taiwan problem is China's internal affair. 3) 
It is unreasonable that the Chinese people are not represented in the roc. 4) China's 
right to representation in the roc ought to be quickly resolved. (p.153) 
Politics obviously came ahead of sport in the agreement. If this is the case with the 
political-balanced China commission, any activity in which Lord Killanin was directly 
involved could only be more in favor of the PRC, since his position was reasonably biased. 
He kept frequent and close communication with the PRC side and exchanged opinions on 
strategy with Beijing’s sport officials to either force the ROC’s Olympic Committee to 
change its name or quit. Nonetheless, the flexibility was not shown throughout the Olympic 
Movement history but rather when it was critical for the Olympic Movement’s 
development or even survival. 
The incident at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games was a typical product of the 
IOC’s apolitical autonomy and increased flexibility. Only a decade earlier, the Indonesian 
Olympic Committee was suspended by the IOC for declining Taiwanese and Israeli 
athletes’ participation in the Asian Games because of Communist China and the Arabic 
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nations’ objection, but the IOC, after a long-time confrontation with the Canadian 
government, made the compromise first and proposed the name change of the ROC’s team. 
Throughout the process, the IOC faced criticism from all over the world, but was adamant 
that the Canadian government should not infringe the integrity of the Olympic Movement 
with its political consideration.23 When the deadlock was about to virtually affect the 
Olympic Games, the IOC made compromise and proposed name change of the ROC’s 
delegation to guarantee the participation of Taiwanese athletes. Participation was the IOC’s 
bottom line. The ROC’s boycott was expected, but it was rather the ROC’s decision—the 
IOC had no liability for the athletes’ forced withdrawal. It was obvious that the flexibility 
the IOC had gained was that Taiwan could be sacrificed in this game.     
A comparison can be drawn. When the IOC attempted to circumvent any political 
means to end the dispute, it ended up clashing with harsh political backlash. However, 
when the IOC took a political approach to work on this issue, the final resolution was barely 
of a political nature. In this case, the IOC lacked the ability to eliminate politicization but 
was capable of minimizing the consequence of politicization by proactively doing politics. 
Meanwhile, the organizational characteristics and abundant resources helped reduce the 
negative impact of the IOC’s political involvement and uphold the principles to the 
maximum.    
4.3 WORLD POLITICS: CATALYTIC BUT NOT DECISIVE 
It is not coincidental that the change of the PRC’s and the ROC’s positions and 
dispositions during the battle was largely in correspondence with that of their international 
statuses. As aforementioned, the United Nations’ recognition of the PRC boosted Lord 
Killanin’s motivation to make a change. The change in the Sino-U.S. relation, more than 
                                                 
23  It was a bigger conundrum for the Canadian government. The ROC’s participation was even more 
unnegotiable for the Canadian government than for the IOC. 
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merely influencing the opinions of the IOC members from the USA, was expected by Lord 
Killanin to be conducive to the solution (Liang, 2007, p.141). Even Brundage referred to 
the UN’s recognition, though informally and personally, in his letter exchange with Dong 
in defense of the IOC’s disposition (IOC, 1979a). Better relations between the PRC and 
other nations also contributed to better understanding, if not acceptance, of its “all or 
nothing” standpoint. Many realized the ridiculousness of the PRC being excluded from the 
Olympic Movement, and a few IOC members, especially those who had close relationship 
with their respective governments, began to voice in favor of the PRC. Interestingly, the 
PRC also used sports as instrument to ameliorate relations with many other countries, such 
as Japan and the United States, etc. (Xu, 2008, pp.117-163). 
Nevertheless, the IOC was not much influenced, at least not acutely, by the 
vicissitudes in world politics. The primary and long-lasting divergence was the IOC’s 
willingness to include both NOCs from China, though “but one China” was proclaimed by 
both parties and supports by their allies in the Cold War. The IOC’s insistence eventually 
paid off and the fruit has survived the globally prevailing “one-China policy,” thanks to 
the PRC’s growth into one of the world’s super powers. While Taiwanese people are still 
excluded from the United Nations, Taiwanese athletes can be organized by a self-
governing, independent regional NOC and participate in the Olympic Games, as long as 
they do not bring up explicit political appeals—it is perfectly in line with the Olympic 
spirits. In terms of inclusiveness, the Nagoya Resolution was unprecedented.  
That ROC seemingly took the upper hand in the 1950s was mainly because of 
Beijing’s extreme aggressiveness rather than because of the world political environment. 
Beijing’s criticism of the IOC as the executor of the American and Western imperialism 
was radically biased, but the IOC was indeed Eurocentric, especially West-Eurocentric, 
which has been easily proved (Hietanen, 1982). Had it been significantly influenced by 
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world politics, the IOC would have coalesced with the Western bloc and fully supported 
the ROC. However, the IOC, on the contrary, regulated that the jurisdiction of the ROC’s 
NOC did not go beyond Taiwan and surrounding islands and requested name change (IOC, 
1959a). The IOC was criticized by governments and media for this resolution, but firmly 
defended its decision (IOC, 1959b).   
Therefore, the world politics was undoubtedly a predictor of the trend of the two 
Chinas’ battle within the IOC, but the IOC avoided embracing the politicians’ decisions. 
Eurocentric as it was, the IOC did not stand with the Western bloc or blindly support the 
ROC’s proclamation. The Olympic Movement could have welcomed and accepted the 
NOC from a less-radical, less-assertive PRC, had there been one. After the PRC triumphed 
in world politics, the IOC, though eager for reinstating Beijing’s Olympic Committee, 
endeavored to retain the Taiwanese athletes. Again, it is the IOC’s organizational 
characteristics that helped balance the effect of global political trend and keep out the 
severest part, though not all, of political race’s brutality.          
4.4 THE SWITCH: BEFORE AND AFTER THE PRC RETURNED THE UN 
The reinstatement of the PRC and the expulsion of the ROC in the UN did not 
directly affect the IOC’s decision. However, the balance of power in the three-party 
struggle indeed was shifted. The ROC was still the weakest party and only got even weaker, 
having lost worldwide diplomatic recognition. The major shift took place in the bilateral 
interaction between the IOC and the PRC—both expected rapprochement, the PRC had 
more interests at stake. 
Although it continued claiming to be the sole legitimate representative of China 
and asked for expelling Taiwan, Beijing’s purpose changed. Before its withdrawal in 1958, 
and even during the years of the GANEFO, Beijing’s goal was to earn global diplomatic 
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recognition—when it was impossible to join world-wide intergovernmental organizations, 
especially the United Nations, Beijing turned to influential non-government organizations, 
such as the IOC (Yu, 2008). The PRC had nothing to lose, but the IOC’s recognition of its 
Olympic Committee could have been a win for Beijing. In comparison, the Olympic 
Movement risked losing the world’s biggest population group, and it did. It is also the case 
when the GANEFO was formed to challenge and undermine the IOC’s supremacy. 
After 1971, however, the PRC replaced the ROC as the much more recognized 
China. Beijing realized the tremendous negative impact of the ostracism from the Olympic 
Movement, in which Taiwan’s Olympic Committee was the only NOC from China. Had 
Beijing not solved the problem, it could have suffered more than the ostracism in sport—
just like what Beijing intended to do two decades ago, Taiwan could politicize its 
participation in the IOC and remain a threat to Beijing’s legitimacy. On the contrary, 
having lost mainland China long before, the worst case for the IOC was rather recognizing 
the PRC and losing Taiwan—the Olympic principles would be compromised, but the 
Olympic Movement would actually expand.     
Beijing had an even wider edge in the first round but made no progress, but the 
final outcome was that Beijing made compromise and the Olympic Movement retained 
Taiwan at the end of the second round. One of the reasons, of course, is the obstinacy of 
both parties—the PRC attached enormous political significance to the status of “the only 
China” in the Olympic Movement, while the IOC was indifferent to Beijing’s political 
considerations. Retrospectively, the PRC could have taken a milder position and sought 
evolutionary change after admission—after all, the dual recognition of the Chinese 
Olympic Committee and the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee almost three decades later 
was no better. Unfortunately, it is unlikely even if history was rerun, since Beijing still 
considers its intransigence righteous and critical. Another reason is the PRC’s lack of 
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understanding of the Olympic Movement and misuse of strategy. All the requests from the 
Communist government and from individuals on behalf of the government, especially the 
IOC member, Dong, added up to the impression of Red China’s invasion. The IOC could 
have communicated with the Beijing better and got better understanding of the PRC’s 
standpoint, had Beijing downplayed or understated the government’s stake. In addition, 
Brundage’s influence cannot be ignored because of his retention of Taiwan’s Olympic 
Committee. Other motives put aside, his insistence of non-politicization was justifiable, 
and Taiwanese athletes were saved from the highly-likely long-lasting, if not permanent, 
political ostracism.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
This thesis interprets the solution of the Two Chinas Question from the perspective 
of the IOC, which hardly exists in the literature in Olympic studies. It contributes to a better 
understanding of the organizational behavior of the IOC faced with inevitable political 
disputes. Despite his efforts to stand neutral, the background of the researcher, a Chinese 
native, may influence his interpretation of events. The researcher includes as many 
literature and resources in Chinese language as possible, but acknowledges the 
inaccessibility of official documents from the PRC and the ROC. 
The history is an open book—the twenty-eight years’ battle between the PRC and 
ROC, including the IOC’s role and actions can be interpreted from different perspectives. 
The IOC was the promoter of the Olympic Movement, the protector of athletes and was 
forced into rivalry with both the PRC and the ROC. Besides, unfortunately, the attempt to 
be a mediator was not successful. It is arguable whether the IOC could have done better. 
For sure, many details exposed the IOC’s lack of knowledge of the China problem. 
Brundage mistakenly thought Taiwan had only been part of Japan (Fan & Xiong, 2002).24 
Lord Killanin, considered by the Chinese government a friend of Chinese people, could 
not spell Shouyi Dong’s name right for even just once (Lord Killanin, 1983, pp.101-108). 
However, the moves that the IOC took through the years were generally justifiable and 
appropriate.  
The IOC and the Olympic Movement were seldom the center of the study in the 
existing literature—they are either considered a less significant party or portrayed as the 
                                                 
24 Taiwan was indeed a Japanese colony before the end of World War II. But before Japanese occupation, 
Taiwan was part of the Qing Dynasty, whose territory went even beyond the current territory of the People’s 
Republic of China. It is yet disputable whether or not Taiwan is a part of China, but it is undeniable that 
Taiwan used to be part of a monarchy together with mainland China.    
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victim who paid dearly for its naivety and quixotism. It is not the whole truth. This thesis 
argues that the IOC upheld its non-politicization principle, which suffered minimum harm, 
while showing certain flexibility. The flexibility refers to the willingness to make 
concession and professing politics. The adherence to principles was self-evident during 
Brundage’s presidency and not understated during Lord Killanin’s. Indeed, the latter was 
more pragmatic on the Two Chinas Question and proactively played the game for desired 
outcome, but it is the pragmatism that allowed the IOC to minimize external political 
infringement and maintain the inclusiveness of the Olympic Movement. Ironically, playing 
the political game turned out to be the key to end political interference. Unlike what many 
believe, this thesis deems the Nagoya Resolution to be a hardly political solution, because 
it did not have substantial political influence or generate further political disputes. 
Therefore, compromise made by the Olympic Movement can be justified by the situation 
and the eventual result. 
The compromise was not made in vain. Mainland China, where the world’s largest 
population group resided, returned to the Olympic Movement, while the Taiwanese people 
could still participate independently. Considering this fact, the Olympic Movement was the 
biggest winner among the three parties of the battle. The IOC and the Olympic Movement 
gained expansion and lost a smattering of integrity—and whether the loss matters is 
arguable. First, as many argue, sport and politics do mix. It is the reality that the IOC must 
face, notwithstanding the no-politics principle of the Olympic Movement. The political 
nature of the Two Chinas Question cannot be ignored. Solution desired, the IOC had to 
face and profess politics, as a result of which, the problem was put to an end. Secondly, 
since the Olympic ideals are a vision to be pursued, the loss is not a real loss. Moreover, it 
turned out that the blatant criticizers, including the USA, the Soviet Union, and the PRC, 
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have imposed more political interference, which only makes the IOC one of the most 
politically neutral and innocent party within the Olympic Movement.     
In comparison, the PRC and the ROC suffered much more loss. The ROC’s 
Olympic Committee kept its membership but had to change its name, flag and anthem, 
which were political presence of the Nationalist government. Despite the reinstatement of 
its NOC and the ban on the ROC’s political presence, the PRC had to accept the reality of 
dual recognition, a less explicit version of “two Chinas,” in the Olympic Movement. 
Neither the PRC government nor the Chinese Olympic Committee has been able to profess 
jurisdiction over sport activities in Taiwan so far. What they lost or failed to achieve was 
exactly what they fought the politicized battle for.   
The Olympic Movement also survived the bold challenger in the 1960s, the 
GANEFO, which was tremendously supported and sponsored by the PRC. It was partly 
because of the IOC’s ban on the NOCs’ participation, which made the level of the 
competitions in the GANEFO much lower than Olympic level. The GANEFO’s quick 
death proved the unreliability of politicizing sports—both unfavorable domestic situations 
and international frictions brought negative impact on the celebration of sport events. The 
PRC enjoyed political gains from supporting the GANEFO, but could not move forward 
to change the international sport order.    
The IOC’s autonomy was the fundamental reason that the IOC survived the Cold 
War and eventually solved the Two Chinas Question with minimum political exploitation. 
The IOC members might have connection with their respective governments, but most 
were able to vote as individuals who did not completely honor the brutality of inter-
governmental diplomacy—this non-intergovernmental and apolitical decision-making 
mechanism was considered reactionary and hypocritical by many, including the PRC and 
Indonesia during the GANEFO Movement, but helped the Olympic Movement stand firm 
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and survive relentless exploitation of super powers and international conflicts. Among all 
the IOC members, the presidents were the most important figures. They had enough power 
to set the agenda, influence the members’ opinions, and shape the IOC’s position. This 
point is made especially evident by the different dispositions that Brundage and Lord 
Killanin held respectively. Both presidents, their respective motives imperfect but 
justifiable, made efforts to seek the optimal solution to the Two Chinas Question and save 
the Olympic Movement from perilous jeopardy. The Executive Board was where thorough 
and deep discussions were made over the matter and where possible solutions were 
generated and put forward. They Executive Board members also balanced the IOC’s 
position when the Presidents went too far with their personal opinions.   
Meanwhile, the acknowledgement of the IOC’s efforts and achievements doesn’t 
cover the problems that lied within the IOC, some of which hindered the solution. First and 
foremost, politics always existed. Even though the organizational characteristics balanced 
political influence, politics was present, consciously or not, in every member’s views and 
decision-making, not to mention the inevitable organizational politics. In addition, the 
IOC’s struggle for independence from world politics distanced the organization from new 
political happenings and trends, which was a double-edged blade—it helped the IOC delay, 
if not completely block, instant political interference with the Olympic Movement, but also 
created difficulty for effectively communication between the IOC and governments. The 
IOC has made improvement on this issue. The over-empowerment of the IOC President 
was another problem that emerged. But it is a puzzle that is unlikely to be solved. Nor is 
restriction on presidential power surely a better way. Both Brundage and Lord Killanin 
exerted personal influence over the decision-making at a certain point of time and faced 
harsh criticism. However, further derivative problems might have emerged had they not 
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done so. Other problems, such as Eurocentrism and corruption, have also been pointed out 
or exposed during the later years. 
Shortcomings admitted, the IOC’s good will was undisputed. Lord Killanin 
expressed the exhilaration he felt when he saw the delegates from both Chinese Olympic 
Committees were talking casually during an IOC Session before long after the Nagoya 
Resolution. Another contribution of the IOC, and most probably an inadvertent one, was 
the creation of a way in which Taiwanese people could participated in international affairs 
not of a political nature. The Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee and Ching-Kuo Wu, the 
current IOC member from Chinese Taipei, were elated when Beijing won the bid for the 
2008 Olympic Games. The PRC also celebrated the breakthrough when Chinese Taipei 
won its first Olympic gold medal in the 2004 Athens Games. Behind all the excitement and 
celebrations, the IOC’s efforts should not be ignored and deserve more attention from 
scholars.  
Ironically, another three decades after the Nagoya Resolution passed, another 
debate over China’s human rights issue emerged prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. 
The Chinese government and the IOC switched their position. The IOC and other countries 
urged the Chinese government to improve the domestic human rights condition, while the 
Chinese government insisted that sport should not be mixed with politics. This position 
switch, along with the reasons behind and the impact forward, is worth studying. More 
researches given, it is expectable to map out the intricate and thorough network of the 
relation between sport and world politics, which covers all major levels of sport activities—
the Olympic Movement, non-Olympic sports, and massive sports—and includes as many 
actors as possible—governments, international organizations, multinational corporations, 
and individuals, etc. It hopefully will help interpret sport-politics dynamics and maintain 
the integrity of sport, especially from political infringement, while pursuing sport for all.  
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List of Abbriviations 
ACSF    All China Sports Federation, the 
CNAAF   Chinese National Amateur Athletics Federation, the 
CPC    Communist Party of China, the 
DPRK    Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the 
FIFA    Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
GANEFO   Games of the New Emerging Forces, the 
IAAF    International Association of Athletics Federations, the 
IOC    International Olympic Committee, the 
NGB    National Sport Governing Body 
NGO    Non-Governmental (International) Organization 
NOC    National Olympic Committee 
PRC    People’s Republic of China, the 
ROC    Republic of China (Taiwan), the 
UN    United Nations, the 
US/USA   United States of America, the 
USSR    Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
WWII    Second World War, the 
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